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Abstract
Avicenna’s Neoplatonic account of divine providence and theodicy was hugely influ-
ential on later philosophical and religious thought in the Islamic world. However, it
was severely criticised by one of his earlier commentators, the theologian-philosopher
Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). While Avicenna champions an optimist theodicean
thesis of a plenitude of good to support the theory of providence integrated into his
cosmogony, his commentator counters by arguing for a plenitude of evil and an overall
pessimist anti-theodicy. Rejecting Avicenna’s ontological-cum-cosmological account
of evil, al-Rāzī argues that a theodicy must be strictly subject-centred and is ultimately
a futile exercise. This article includes a study and translation of the relevant section in
his commentary on Avicenna’s al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt (Pointers and Reminders).
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Despite the appeal that the Neoplatonic account of divine providence and
theodicy propounded by Avicenna exercised in later philosophical and reli-
gious thought, one of his earlier commentators was singularly unimpressed.1
In his commentary on Avicenna’s al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt (Pointers and Remind-
1 This theory of providence, of course, dominated the later philosophical tradition of Neopla-
tonised Aristotelianism. Beyond this tradition, it had a profound impact most notably on
the theology of Avicenna’s critic al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111) (Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought;
Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System). However, most sixth/twelfth-century theologians
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ers), the influential philosopher and theologian Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/
1210) subjects this account to what is, without a doubt, the most radical philo-
sophical response it received in medieval Arabic. He refers to this discussion
in a later text as his most developed and definitive treatment of the sub-
ject.2While Avicenna champions an optimist theodicean thesis of a plenitude
of good to support the theory of providence integrated into his cosmogony,
his commentator counters by arguing for a plenitude of evil and an over-
all pessimist anti-theodicy. RejectingAvicenna’s ontological-cum-cosmological
account and justification of evil, al-Rāzī argues that a theodicy must be strictly
subject-centred and that ultimately it is a futile exercise.This refutation ismoti-
vated, not by theological contrarianism, as all too easily assumed on traditional
readings of al-Rāzī’s commentary and thought, but first and foremost by the
commentator’s critical method of investigation, as I argued in a recent publi-
cation.3What followshere is an interpretationanda translationof the sectional
commentary in which this criticism is set forth.
1 Avicenna on Providence and Theodicy in the Išārāt
We shall take our cue from Avicenna’s Išārāt. In the second part of the book,
which deals with physics and metaphysics, providence is firstly discussed in
Chapter (namaṭ) 6, titled, “On final causes and their principles, and on the hier-
archy” of existents.4 Al-Rāzī in his commentary helpfully divides the chapter
were critical of this theory—for instance, the Ašʿarī al-Šahrastānī (d. 548/1153) (Nihāya,
pp. 260–267) and the Muʿtazilī al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141) (Tuḥfa, pp. 9–13, 110–114).
2 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, p. 478. A shorter version of the same criticism is found in the Mulaḫḫaṣ
(fols. 265b–266b), a philosophical work dating slightly earlier than the commentary on the
Išārāt. For an overview of al-Rāzī’s criticism of Avicenna’s theodicy, seemyTeleological Ethics,
pp. 156ff. The present article looks more closely at the discussion in his commentary on the
Išārāt.
3 Shihadeh, “Al-Rāzī’s Commentary,” pp. 297ff. A hybrid of two distinct commentarial genres—
namely, exegetical commentary andaporetic commentary—andhence combining exegetical
exposition and aporetics, the book has a programmatic commentarial agenda rooted in its
author’s method of critical enquiry, or research (baḥṯ), which he presents as an alternative
to the traditional school philosophy of mainstream Avicennists and the counter-Avicennist
current. Al-Rāzī criticises the former group for their uncritical following (taqlīd) of tradition,
and the latter for their fixation on dialectic (ǧadal). On the distinction between research phi-
losophy and school philosophy, see alsoGutas, “Avicenna andAfter”. I amgrateful to Professor
Gutas for sharing this forthcoming paper with me.
4 Avicenna, Išārāt, p. 158 (all references are toForget’s edition; chapternumbers areof Part II, on
physics andmetaphysics). On Avicenna’s theory of providence and evil, see also Belo, Chance
Downloaded from Brill.com06/14/2019 12:40:54PM
via SOAS University of London
avicenna’s theodicy and al-rāzī’s anti-theodicy 63
Intellectual History of the Islamicate World 7 (2019) 61–84
into three problems (masʾala), explaining both the chapter’s overall internal
organisation and how the first problem follows on from the previous chap-
ter.5 He groups the first nine passages under the first problem (hence, VI.1.1–
9), which he titles, “That all that acts through volition (irāda) and intention
(qaṣd) necessarily seeks to be perfected”.6 In this cluster of passages, Avicenna
addresses the question of whether the acts of the higher efficient causes, above
all the First Cause and secondarily the celestial intellects, are motivated by
final causes (ġāya). Though he does not mention them by name, his discus-
sion includes a refutation of the doctrine of God’s moral agency taught by the
Muʿtazilī school of kalām, on which their theodicy is premised.7 As far as I
know, the Muʿtazilī background to Avicenna’s treatment of providence, espe-
cially in the Išārāt, has so far gone unnoticed.
Avicenna argues that for a thing to be unconditionally perfect, and hence
truly self-sufficient (ġanī), it cannot depend on anything extraneous to itself
for either its essence or any of its intrinsic attributes, though it may be depen-
dent on another for purely relational attributes. So if the First Cause creates,
and then provides for, things other than Itself in order to do what is morally
good (al-awlā, al-aḥsan, al-awǧab, al-alyaq, al-ǧamīl), It would do so in order
to acquire the attribute of being amorally good agent. It would, accordingly, be
perfected by the things It creates, because It would lack this attribute were It
not to create or provide. Therefore, the First Cause does not act for the sake of
(li-aǧl) lower beings. Its acts, hence, are not motivated by a purpose (ġaraḍ),
a final cause, which It voluntarily (bi-l-irāda) chooses (iḫtāra) to pursue to the
exclusion of alternative courses of action. Avicenna makes an unmistakable
reference here to the Muʿtazilī doctrine that God’s acts are morally motivated,
and specifically to their sub-doctrine that the creationof theworld andhumans
was a good (ḥasan) actmotivated byGod’s beneficence (iḥsān), because it prof-
fered to creatures the possibility of attaining great advantages (manfaʿa) and
that further acts are performed out of either favour or duty to them.8 Denying
and Determinism, pp. 108ff.; Steel, “Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas”; Rashed, “Théodicée et
approximation”; Michot, La destinée de l’homme, pp. 57–68. The reading presented here is
mine.
5 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 433–434.
6 Avicenna, Išārāt, pp. 158–160; cf. Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt VI.5, pp. 296–298 (=Metaphysics, pp. 231–234),
for amore detailed discussion; al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 433–442. For ease of reference, I shall apply
the section numbers of al-Rāzī’s commentary to the Išārāt.
7 On Muʿtazilī theodicy, see Heemskerk, Suffering in the Muʿtazilite Theology; Vasalou, Moral
Agents. On its underlying theory of ethical value and obligation, see Shihadeh, “Theories of
Ethical Value,” pp. 388–396.
8 Cf. ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, Muġnī, 11, pp. 58ff., 134 ff.
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that the Creator acts, out of amoral motive, for the benefit of lower things, Avi-
cenna defends an alternative theory of divine providence (ʿināya), according to
which the First Cause instead acts by way of munificence (ǧūd) (as opposed to
theMuʿtazilī principle of beneficence), which is the provision of what is proper
to creatures not for a purpose.
Avicenna returns to providence in Chapter 7 of the Išārāt, after discussing
the knowledge that the First Cause has of Itself and of things other than
Itself.9 Earlier in the book, he explained that the First Cause is the ultimate
efficient cause of all possible existents, which proceed from It either directly
or indirectly.10 Here he argues that the First Cause moreover knows all pos-
sible existents, and that It brings them into being in accordance with Its all-
encompassing knowledge. It knows Its first effect insofar as it is necessarily
caused by It, and knows effects further down the chain of being insofar as they
will necessarily be caused by their respective efficient causes. This knowledge,
therefore, is not affective and acquired post hoc, but ontologically prior (sābiq)
to the existence of knowledge-objects, and corresponds to the metaphysically
necessary cosmic structure that proceeds from the First Cause through the
chain of necessitating efficient causes.11 The First’s determination (qaḍāʾ) of
all possible existents lies in Its knowledge, and is realised through Its cre-
ative agency, which in fact is identical to Its knowledge.12 Providence, Avicenna
explains, is the First’s all-encompassing knowledge of the cosmic order of the
good (niẓām al-ḫayr) proceeding necessarily from Itself, which is the optimal
possible order (aḥsan al-niẓām).13 As Avicenna explains in the Šifāʾ, the First
and other higher causes necessitate their effects just as water, fire and the
appetitive power necessitate, respectively, cooling, heating and sexual desire
by their essences, the only difference being that the higher causes are also pos-
sessed of knowledge of their effects.14
The next five passages, which conclude Chapter 7 of Avicenna’s text, are
grouped by al-Rāzī into a problem for which he borrows the title of the cor-
responding discussion in the Metaphysics of the Šifāʾ: “On the manner of the
entry of evil in divine determination (al-qaḍāʾ al-ilāhī)”.15 In the first passage,
9 Avicenna, Išārāt, p. 185.
10 Avicenna, Išārāt, p. 140.
11 Cf. Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt VIII.7, pp. 362–363 (=Metaphysics, pp. 291–293).
12 Avicenna, Išārāt, p. 185.
13 The expression niẓām al-ḫayr occurs, for instance, in: Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt VIII.7,
pp. 363ff.; IX.4, p. 403; IX.6, pp. 415 ff. (=Metaphysics, pp. 291 ff.; 327; 339ff.).
14 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.3, pp. 398–399 (=Metaphysics, p. 323).
15 Avicenna, Išārāt, pp. 185–189; al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 547–566; cf. Šifā’, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, p. 414 (=
Metaphysics, p. 339).
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labelled a “pointer” (išāra), Avicenna provides a general account of the causes
of evil in the cosmos, and in four supplementary passages—three labelled “a
false notion and a reminder” (wahm wa-tanbīh) and one reminder (tanbīh)—
he develops this account by addressing specific cases that could be cited as
counter-evidence. Here we shall focus on the general account in VII.8.1.
The problem that motivates the discussion of evil, which both in this pas-
sage and indeed in the more extensive treatments in the Šifāʾ and the Naǧāt is
implied and not stated, arises at the juncture of two principles that Avicenna
has already put forth—namely, his absolute determinism and his valuative
characterisation of the work of the First Cause as good and providential. If the
First Cause is the ultimate efficient cause of all possible existents, such that
nothing comes to be by an efficient cause lying outside Its determination, and
if the cosmos It brings into being is, as just explained, the best possible cosmos,
then, presumably, it should be entirely good and devoid of evil. However, this
account of providence appears to be disrupted by the observation of evil actu-
ally occurring in the world. So Avicenna goes on to offer a theodicy, which in
effect explains evil away. In his more extended treatment of the subject in the
Šifāʾ, he differentiates between two types of evil—namely, evil per se (al-šarr
bi-l-ḏāt) and accidental evil (al-šarr bi-l-ʿaraḍ).16 Evil per se includes such phe-
nomena as inborn deformities and injuries, and is privative and intrinsic to the
thing itself. The essence of evil, therefore, is privation (ʿadam), specifically pri-
vation in the first perfection proper to a thing on account of its species.17 Earlier
in the book, Avicenna identified the goodwith existence.18 Such per se evils are
caused not by the higher,metaphysical efficient cause that confers the forms of
sub-lunar objects—that is, the Agent Intellect—but rather by a deficiency in
thematerial substrate of the object, which renders it an imperfect receptacle to
the form. This deficiency either lies in a disposition that occurs to the material
substrate at the moment of a thing’s coming-to-be and hinders the readiness,
or proximate potentiality, of matter to receive a perfect form (as in the case
of inborn deformities), or it supervenes (ṭaraʾa) on matter after the coming-
to-be of a thing causing an imperfection therein (as in the case of injury, or
the absence of water for a living being).19 Either way, the deficiency is engen-
dered by the activity of natural efficient causes, that is, causes that produce
16 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, pp. 414–422 (=Metaphysics, pp. 339–347).
17 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, pp. 416, 417, 422 (= Metaphysics, pp. 340, 341–342, 347). So,
as he explains, because it is not a privation in a thing, absolute non-existence is not evil.
18 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt VIII.6, pp. 355–356 (=Metaphysics, pp. 283–284).
19 Reading aw li-amr forwa-li-amr (Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, p. 416, l. 11 =Metaphysics, p. 340, l. 17).
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motion in existent things.20 Accidental evil, on the other hand, is extrinsic to
the thing itself and lies in such natural efficient causes, which either conduce
to a privation in the thing itself or serve as obstructions to the thing’s realisa-
tion of perfection.21 For instance, when fire burns a human, it causes an injury,
which is an intrinsic, privative evil; but the individual will moreover perceive
the fire, the external cause of the injury, as evil. However, fire is not an intrin-
sic, per se evil (šarr fī nafsihi), because in itself it serves a good end and is a
necessary part of the most perfect cosmic order possible, whose perfection is
to possess the property of burning. Its evilness, rather, is only relative to (bi-l-
qiyās ilā) certain types of things, such as animal bodies, with which it comes
into contact adventitiously (bi-l-ittifāq).22 Avicenna describes these adventi-
tious occurrences as unintended collisions (muṣādamāt, muṣākkāt) between
different components of the cosmos as they undergo motion. Overall, he rea-
sons, most existents realise the good they are intended for by their nature,
whereas evils, of both types, occur only in a minority of sub-lunar existents;
most humans, for instance, are neither born deformed, nor burnt by fire. There-
fore, good is predominant (akṯarī), and evil minor (aqallī) and sparse.
This theodicy is summarised nicely in the following concise account of Avi-
cenna’s theory of divine providence given in his ʿUyūn al-ḥikma:
When it is said [that the First is] pure good, this means [1] that It is per-
fect of existence and free from potentiality and imperfection; for evilness
in a thing is a privation specific to it. It is said of It that It is good also
[2] because It provides to everything the goodness proper to it; for It
provides benefit essentially and by way of bestowal (wiṣāl), and causes
harm accidentally and byway of inhibition (infiṣāl). By “bestowal”, Imean
the reception of Its effects; and by “inhibition”, I mean that Its effects be
impeded.23
The First Cause’s goodness in the second sense is associatedwith both the good
It produces and the status of evil as either accidental or privative. So unless and
20 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, pp. 416–417 (= Metaphysics, pp. 340–341). Imperfections
can also be the result of a deficient or excessive quantity of matter (cf. Avicenna, Šifāʾ,
Ṭabīʿiyyāt I.I.13, p. 85). For Avicenna, natural efficient causes produce motion, whereas
metaphysical efficient causes produce existence.
21 Reading al-muʿdim for al-maʿdūm (Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, p. 416, l. 7 [= Metaphysics, p. 340,
l. 12]; cf. l. 17).
22 Cf. Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt VI.5, p. 298 (= Metaphysics, p. 225); cf. Šifāʾ, Ṭabīʿiyyāt I.I.13,
pp. 81–90.
23 Avicenna, ʿUyūn, 59.
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until evil is shown to be accidental or privative, its presence in the cosmos will
appear prima facie inconsistent with the First Cause’s goodness.
In Išārāt VII.8.1, the discussion likewise turns on the problem of the pres-
ence of evil in the cosmos, when the First Cause is absolutely good. A brief and
partial theodicy, which appeals only to the accidental type of evil, is offered.24
Avicenna begins with a fourfold logical disjunction (qisma) of possible things
into those that are purely good, those that are in themselves good but acci-
dentally evil, those that are purely evil, and those that are predominantly evil.
“Becausepuremunificence is theprinciple for the emanationof the existence25
that is good and right (ṣawāb)”, he argues, the first two divisions are necessar-
ily brought into being. So, purely good things exist, the case in point being the
celestial intellects. Things of the second type too exist, because they are indis-
pensable to the good cosmic order and as such themselves good, despite the
accidental evil they cause when they collide with certain types of other things.
Not to create such things would, in the large scheme of the cosmos, be to with-
hold the great good (ḫayr kaṯīr) that they provide; and to do so “in order to pre-
vent a minor evil would amount to a great evil”.26 Avicenna gives the examples
of fire, which causes harm to an animal body when it collides with it, and ani-
mal bodies, which “like fire”may cause harm to other things. Because of various
accidental evils, some humans will acquire false beliefs andmoral vices, which
may be detrimental to them in the hereafter.27 Overall, however, most humans
live in a sound condition (salāma) and only aminority are affected by evils; and
evils, he opines, affect humans only for a small proportion of the time. There-
fore, evils arenot only accidental to the cosmos, but alsominor features thereof.
Although the third and fourth divisions of the disjunction—things that are
purely evil, and things that are predominantly evil—are not discussed, it goes
without saying that neither actually exists, as in fact confirmed in the Šifāʾ.28
2 Al-Rāzī’s Criticism
Al-Rāzī’s extended commentary on VII.8.1, translated in full below, starts with
an overall exegetical commentary, or interpretation (tafsīr), which provides a
24 Avicenna, Išārāt, pp. 185–187.
25 Reading wuǧūd, as in some manuscripts (and Dunyā’s edition, p. 300), for ǧūd, as in For-
get’s edition (p. 186, l. 4).
26 Avicenna, Išārāt, p. 186.
27 Cf. Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, p. 422 (=Metaphysics, p. 347).
28 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, p. 421 (=Metaphysics, p. 346).
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lucid and faithful exposition of the contents of the passage.29 Then follows
an extended aporetic commentary, introduced, as customary in al-Rāzī’s book,
by the clause, “It may be argued” (li-qāʾil an yaqūla).30 He advances two criti-
cisms, which, as is generally characteristic of his aporetic commentary, follow
a logical sequence. Both criticisms go beyond Avicenna’s passage to query its
unstated underpinnings, first the implicit problem that it addresses, and sec-
ond an unstated definition that it assumes.
Al-Rāzī begins his aporetic commentary by asking why Avicenna enquires
into the problem of evil in the first place.31 The problem, he says, presupposes
two doctrines, neither of which, however, is upheld by Avicenna. As already
pointed out, although Avicenna does not explicitly formulate the problem that
leads him to discuss the causes of evil, the discussion is motivated by a ver-
sion of the conventional problem of evil: if God is good and the sole creator
of the world, then why does the world contain evil? For al-Rāzī, this problem
turns on an account of the moral agency of God, and any such account must
be premised on two doctrines.
The first is thatGodbe a voluntary agent, capable of choosing freely between
performing a given act and not performing it. Al-Rāzī reasons that if an effi-
cient cause necessitates its acts through its essence, and does not choose them
freely when it was equally capable of choosing alternative acts, its acts, be they
goodor evil, can have no cause other than the agent’s essence. So if, as Avicenna
holds, God is a necessitating cause, it would be specious then to ask, “Why does
evil occur in His acts?”. For, as al-Rāzī notes briefly towards the end of his com-
mentary on the passage, this question is one that seeks a cause (ʿilla), whereas
the First Cause acts through Its essence and not through some other cause.32
The cause referred to here is a final cause (ʿilla ġāʾiyya), a purpose (maqṣūd),
which would motivate the acts of the First Cause. Al-Rāzī’s objection can be
unpacked as follows. Startingwith the assumption that theCreator is the cause,
direct or indirect, of the cosmos and of all that exists and occurs therein,we can
proceed in either of two directions, depending on which account of agency we
adopt. If the Creator acts by choosing voluntarily out of alternative possible
acts and as such, on Avicenna’s analysis of voluntary action, acts in pursuit of
final causes, He would be capable to choose freely to create either a cosmos
29 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 548–549 (p. 75 below).
30 On the organisation and commentarial procedure of this text, see Shihadeh, “Al-Rāzī’s
Commentary,” esp. pp. 309–312.
31 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 549–550 (p. 76 below).
32 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, p. 555 (pp. 80–81 below).
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devoid of evil, or one in which evil occurs. If He chooses the latter, then that
would raise the question of why He made this choice. If, however, the Creator,
as Avicenna in fact holds, is an efficient cause that necessitates Its acts through
its essence, then Itwould produce everything, good or evil, through sheermeta-
physical necessity. Consequently, the First Causewould not be characterised by
any sort of moral agency, which would require an agent to do good acts and to
refrain from evil ones, and which would render him deserving of blame should
he choose and do evil. On this model, therefore, the problem of evil does not
arise.
The second underpinning of the problem of evil is what al-Rāzī refers to
here as the doctrine that goodness and badness are rational (al-ḥusn wa-l-
qubḥ ʿaqliyyān), which should be read as a reference, not to ethical rationalism
broadly conceived, but specifically to ethical realism of the type propounded
by the Muʿtazila.33 According to this theory, acts can have ethical attributes
that are real and mind-independent, and agents will be under an obligation
to refrain from performing evil acts and will deserve blame should they per-
form them. This, of course, is not a view that Avicenna champions. Al-Rāzī’s
point here is that for evil to be a theological problem that requires a solution,
its occurrence must prima facie stand in tension with the moral agency of the
Creator. However, just as Ašʿarīs do not develop a theodicy because they do not
acknowledge the root problem, so too must Avicenna concede that the pres-
ence of evil in the cosmos does not pose a theological problem. As al-Rāzī puts
it, Avicenna is “exempt” from having to address this problem, so his enquiry
into it is “superfluous” ( fuḍūl).
A traditional Avicennist would respond that the problem that motivates the
discussion is that the First Cause is good in Its essence, and what is good in its
essence must correspondingly be good in its acts and hence produce no evil,
where “good” and “evil” are defined respectively as perfection and imperfec-
tion.34 As such, it seems to presuppose neither of the two theses previously
mentioned. Al-Rāzī, however, would dismiss this argument as rhetorical, as he
does in his commentary on several arguments adduced in Avicenna’s discus-
sion of providence in Išārāt VI.1.35 For without resting on a theory of moral
33 On which, see Shihadeh, “Theories of Ethical Value,” pp. 388–396. In later works, he
expands the scope of ethical rationalism to include non-realist theories (Shihadeh, Teleo-
logical Ethics, Chapter 2).
34 This is how al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) andQuṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1364) formulate
the problem in their super-commentaries on the Išārāt (respectively, Ḥall, pp. 304–305;
Muḥākamāt, pp. 406, 407).
35 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 435, 436, 438–439, 442.
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value and agency, the premise, that necessarily a cause that is good in essence
produces a correspondingly-good effect, remains unsubstantiated.36
Although, at first blush, al-Rāzī’s first criticism might appear to be an ad
hominem (ex concessis) argument (ilzām) that seeks to force Avicennists to
concede an Ašʿarī-style anti-theodicean position, the criticism in fact is not a
theological refutation.37Theologically, it would be a pointless exercise, because
the consequent thesis is premised on a conception of divine agency that is
contrary to the principle of God’s voluntary agency, which, as a fundamental
doctrine (aṣl), has primacy, to an Ašʿarī, over the secondary question ( farʿ) of
whether God’s voluntary acts are subject tomoralmotives. The criticism rather
is philosophicallymotivated, and exhibits al-Rāzī’s dialecticalmethod of inves-
tigation, according to which problems proceed, in the first instance, through a
sequence of logical disjunctions, on which actual historical positions are then
superimposed.38 In the case at hand, the problemof the nature of God’s agency
is primary—specifically, whether the Creator is a necessitating efficient cause
(the position of Avicenna and other Neoplatonised Aristotelians) or a volun-
tary agent (the classical kalām position). If He is a voluntary agent, then either
evil has amind-independent reality (theMuʿtazilī position), or it does not (the
Ašʿarī position). If it does, thenwhy doesGod choose to create aworld inwhich
evil occurs? However, if the Creator is a necessitating cause, then the problem
of evil does not arise. Al-Rāzī’s point is that a good, critical philosopher would
have to concede this.
That said, al-Rāzī’s criticismmay have a secondary, theological motive stem-
ming fromhis interest in exploring resonances betweenAvicennan philosophy
andAšʿarī theology. Itmaybe that by arguing that itwould have beenmore con-
sistent for Avicenna to espouse an anti-theodicean position, he felt that this
might be a point of intersection between the two systems of thought.
What further indicates that al-Rāzī’s criticism should not be read as a the-
ological refutation is that he goes on to offer, on behalf of Avicennists, two
possible alternative objectives for enquiring into the causes and ontology of
evil.39 Towards the end of his commentary on the passage, he says that it is
sound for Avicennists to enquire into this, so long as the enquiry is motivated
by either of these objectives, and hence does not turn on an ostensible tension
36 This objection is actually made by Mīrzā Ǧān al-Bāġnawī (d. 995/1587) in his own super-
commentary on the Išārāt, which is generally sympathetic to al-Rāzī’s commentary
(Ḥāšiya, p. 434).
37 On Ašʿarī anti-theodicy, see Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, pp. 83ff.
38 Shihadeh, “Al-Rāzī’s Commentary,” pp. 299–302.
39 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, p. 550 (p. 76 below).
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between themoral agency of the Creator and the presence of evil.40 The first is
that this enquiry provides a taxonomy of possible existents according to how
good or evil they are, which would allow us to classify existents accordingly.
The central questionwouldprobably thus be: inwhat respects, intrinsic or acci-
dental, is each part of the cosmos good or evil? The investigation would cease
to be motivated by the problem of evil and hence would not be theodicean.
The second is that the enquiry seeks to understand and describe the optimal,
or most perfect, cosmic order (al-niẓām al-akmal), first by establishing a con-
ception of the optimal cosmic order, and then by affirming its existence on the
grounds that the First Cause knows this order and hence creates the cosmos in
accordance with this knowledge. Al-Rāzī does not elaborate, but his proposed
objective seems to alter the problem from “Why does evil occur in the acts of
the First Cause when It is perfectly good in Itself?” to “Why does evil occur in
the cosmos when it is the best possible cosmos?”. Presumably, this would again
render the discussion non-theodicean, as it shifts it away from divine agency to
cosmology.
In his second criticism, al-Rāzī turns from Avicenna’s motive for enquir-
ing into the problem of evil to his solution to it.41 He begins by examining
Avicenna’s concepts of good and evil, which form the starting point for the
fivefold logical disjunction of possible existents into the purely good, the pre-
dominantly good, the neutral, in which good and evil are equivalent (amissing
division included in the disjunction set out in the Šifāʾ),42 the predominantly
evil and the purely evil. Al-Rāzī reintroduces the per se, intrinsic notion of
evil as privation, which Avicenna leaves out of the theodicy briefly laid out
in the Išārāt. He complains that it is a commonplace—a conventional (išta-
hara, hencemašhūr) view—amongAvicennists to assert that good is existence
and evil is non-existence, assertions that they reiterate uncritically and sup-
port using a mere handful of examples: for instance, both the breaking up of
the continuity of an injured person’s body and the subsequent loss of life are
privative. Now, the assertions, “Good is existence” and “Evil is non-existence”,
al-Rāzī reasons, either define the expressions “good” and “evil”, or are proposi-
tions that predicate existence of good, and non-existence of evil. If the former,
thenAvicenna is entitled todefine these expressions thus, because anyonemay,
in principle, assign any meaning to any expression. Which is to say that his
definitions would be nominal, or more precisely stipulative, since they serve
merely to inform us of the meanings that he and fellow Neoplatonists chose to
40 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, p. 555 (p. 81 below).
41 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 550–551 (pp. 76–77 below).
42 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, p. 421 (=Metaphysics, pp. 345–346).
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give to these terms. However, al-Rāzī objects that such definitions would not
require a supporting argument such as the one adduced by Avicenna. If, on
the other hand, the assertions are propositions, then their subjects, “good” and
“evil”, should firstly be defined; yet Avicenna offers no such definition. What
is more, Avicenna’s argument is an argument from analogy (tamṯīl), one that
starts from particular examples (sg.miṯāl) and arrives at the universal proposi-
tions, “Good is existence” and “Evil is non-existence”. He refers us to Avicenna’s
own verdict that analogical arguments are non-demonstrative.43
Aswe saw earlier from the corresponding discussion in the Šifāʾ, Avicenna in
fact holds that privation defines “evil”; it is evil per se (bi-l-ḏāt).44 He acknowl-
edges that the expression has other senses, such as pain, but deems these as
adventitious features that are sometimes associatedwith privation and as such
extraneous to the definition of “evil”. So these senses are reducible to the pri-
mary sense of privation. Pain occurs when the continuity of a bodily organ is
broken up by an external cause, such as fire, and the absence of continuity is
privative; so even though “pain” and “distress” (ġamm) denote existent things
(maʿānīhā wuǧūdiyya), these “go back to privations and imperfections”, and
therefore, it seems, merit no further consideration as evils requiring, in their
own right, of justification against the backdrop of a perfectly-ordered cosmos
produced by a provident Creator.45 It is indeed striking how little attentionAvi-
cenna affords, andhowhe effectively trivialises, bodily suffering inhis theodicy,
which rests on a largely ontological analysis of evil. Bodily pain and distress
hardly register in the broader, cosmic scheme of things, and they, after all, are
given an inferior status in Avicenna’s soteriology and eschatology. Just as bodily
pleasures, which humans share with other animals (or, with donkeys, as Avi-
cenna has it!), are base in comparison to intellectual happiness, so too are the
severest bodily pains insignificant in comparison to the misery that the soul
may experience.46
Despite considering the two foregoing interpretations of Avicenna’s asser-
tions, “Good is existence” and “Evil is non-existence”, al-Rāzī, in the Mulaḫḫaṣ,
clearly reads them as defining “good” and “evil”. He complains that because
these definitions, in his view, are stipulative, the problem at the centre of Avi-
43 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Manṭiq IV. al-Qiyās IX.23, pp. 568–569; Naǧāt, pp. 107–108.
44 See also al-Ṭūsī’s response to al-Rāzī’s objection (Ḥall, 3, p. 305).
45 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, p. 419 (= Metaphysics, p. 343). Marmura renders tatbaʿu as
“follow [from]” (his brackets). What Avicenna seems to intend, however, is that pains not
only follow privations as their effects, but also go back to them in their evilness. So pain is
not evil in itself.
46 Avicenna, Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.7, pp. 423ff., esp. pp. 427–428 (=Metaphysics, pp. 351–352).
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cenna’s theodicy is fundamentally semantic, in that it turns merely on what
wemean (ʿanaynā) by expressions (baḥṯ lafẓī).47 From his reductive definition
of evil, Avicenna adumbrates, through the foregoing disjunction, a thoroughly
sanitised perspective of the quality and quantity of evil in the cosmos. In the
commentary on the Išārāt, al-Rāzī counters by submitting that, in “common
andprevalent parlance” (al-ʿurf al-ʿāmmal-mašhūr), “evil” in fact denotes noth-
ing but pain or what results in pain, that is, any direct or indirect cause thereof.
Likewise, “good” denotes either pleasure, or the neutral state of bodily and psy-
chological soundness, inwhichneither painnor pleasure are experienced.This,
hence, is the principal lexical definition of the term “evil”, and it is the sense
that must be the foremost concern in a theodicy. For if a problem centres on
a choice between two nominal definitions, it seems rather counter-intuitive to
opt for a stipulative definition proposed by an elite group of philosophers over
a sound and prevalent lexical definition, especially when the problem is often
faced by non-philosophers. By identifying the lexical definitions of “good” and
“evil” as primary, al-Rāzī reorients the discussion from the ontology of the cos-
mos to the subjective perceptions of pleasure and pain, somuch so that instead
of Avicenna’s disjunction of existent things based on their degree of perfection
and inter-collisions, al-Rāzī lays out an alternative, subject-centred division
of good and evil according to the “state of a living being” (ḥāl al-ḥayawān),
which he proceeds to elaborate both qualitatively, in terms of the ontology of
perceptual contents, and quantitatively, in terms of their amount and inten-
sity.
Al-Rāzī’s threefold division is that, at any given moment, a living being can
be either (i) in pleasure, which is subjectively good, or (ii) in pain, which is
subjectively evil, or (iii) in neither pleasure nor pain, which is a subjectively
neutral state.Through this division, he countersAvicenna’s ontological division
throughwhich he advances his qualitative view that evil is essentially privative
and thequantitative corollary that it isminor in the cosmos, andhe argues, con-
trarily, that it is in fact good that is overwhelmingly privative and meagre, and
evil that is existent and in much greater supply. As for pain, everyone, al-Rāzī
says, agrees that it is an existent thing. By everyone, he means philosophers,
who recognised pain as a perception, and theologians, who considered it to
be an accident, in the sense of a superadditional object (maʿnā) that super-
venes upon the body. The reality of pain is a point, as already noted, that Avi-
cenna himself concedes. What people ordinarily refer to as “evil”, therefore,
is an existent thing and not privative. The ontology of pleasure, on the other
47 Al-Rāzī, Mulaḫḫaṣ, fol. 265b.
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hand, was disputed, most notably by the philosopher Abū Bakr Muḥammad
ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī (d. 313/925), who maintained that pleasure was nothing
more than the cessation (zawāl) of pain. On this analysis, eating, for example,
appears pleasurable, not because it causes some real sensation of pleasure, but
only because it relieves the prior pain of hunger.48 Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī reports
counter-arguments adduced, as he says, by philosophers and theologians to
affirm the reality of pleasure.49 For instance, one finds pleasure in perceiving
a sound or an image, which one previously did not know existed; this pleasure
cannot be reduced to the cessation of a prior pain of desire. He does not fol-
low through the question of the ontology of pleasure here, but instead goes on
to propose a middle position. According to this position, pleasures divide into
real ones (laḏḏaḥaqīqiyya), which are an existent quality (kayfiyyawuǧūdiyya),
and mere cessations of prior pains, which are hence non-existent states (ḥāla
ʿadamiyya); however, the majority of pleasures that people experience in this
world (as opposed to the hereafter) are of the latter type, a point that al-Rāzī
illustrates through several examples. These examples include the most impor-
tant types of pleasures, including those associatedwith food, drink, sex, wealth
and social status. Real pleasures, such as those found in perceiving a sound
or an image that one previously did not know existed, which we may class as
aesthetic pleasures, are exceedingly sparse, “like a drop in the ocean”.50 The
last of the states set out in al-Rāzī’s threefold division is the neutral, base-
line state of health (ṣiḥḥa), or soundness (salāma), in which the living being
finds neither pleasure nor pain, and as such is neither good nor evil. Sound-
ness here refers to the absence of causes for either bodily or psychological pain,
which can be internal to the body, such as illnesses, or external to it, such as
humans with whom one associates. This neutral state of soundness, he argues,
is definitely not pleasurable, and accordingly cannot be deemed good, because
real pleasure is an experiential state that the perceiver finds internally within
oneself (ḥālawiǧdāniyya)—the perceiver’s “finding” (wiǧdān) presupposes the
perceived state’s existence (wuǧūd)—and one does not experience such an
internal state frommere health.51
48 Cf. Ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī, Ṭibb, pp. 36ff.; Adamson, “Platonic Pleasures”.
49 Tomy knowledge, extant responses to Ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī’s theory of pleasure are all by
theologians. For instance, Ibn Mattawayh, Taḏkira, 1, pp. 40, 163–165; Abū Rašīd, Ziyādāt,
pp. 285–286, 291–293; ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, Muġnī, 11, pp. 80–81.
50 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, p. 555 (p. 81 below).
51 On wiǧdān see, for instance, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, 1, pp. 118–119. The notion that health is not
pleasurable derives from Ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī (Adamson, “Platonic Pleasures,” pp. 84ff.).
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Overall, therefore, humans spend almost the entirety of their lives either in
a neutral state, or striving to prevent or eliminate various sorts of pain, rang-
ing from the severe pains of illness to the mild inconveniences permeating
everyday life. Pleasures of both variants, especially real pleasures, are seldom
experienced, and then only fleetingly. So in quantitative terms, it is not good,
but evil that is overwhelmingly prevalent (ġālib). The plenitude of evil in al-
Rāzī’s world is directly antithetical to the plenitude of good in Avicenna’s. This
bleak pessimism is not a position that al-Rāzī proposes for dialectical expedi-
ency, but, as I have shown elsewhere, reflects his true conviction.52
Al-Rāzī, accordingly, advances a reductio ad absurdum against the notion
that God creates the world for a purpose (maqṣūd).53 His purpose cannot be
to afford humans and other animals the possibility to experience pleasures,
because pains in fact far outweigh pleasures; so the net sum would be a great
amount of pain. It cannot be to afford them the possibility to experience pains,
as this would render creation an act of “pure evil”. The purpose, finally, cannot
be to afford themneither possibility, as this would render creation purposeless,
and as such less compelling an option than not creating at all. The conclusion
that the First Cause does not create the world for a purpose, he then notes, is
acknowledged by the critical investigators (muḥaqqiqūn) among the philoso-
phers, which is to say, those who are not motivated by partisan bias and adher-
ence to received teachings—a reference primarily to Avicenna, who defended
this view earlier in the Išārāt. This conclusion confirms al-Rāzī’s earlier con-
tention that if the Creator is a cause that necessitates its effects and does not
act in pursuit of a final cause, then the cosmos It produces may contain (non-
accidental and non-privative) evil. Here he concludes that the cosmos is in fact
predominantly evil.
To recapitulate, al-Rāzī takes a strongly anti-theodicean position. In his the-
ological works, this stance finds expression in his version of Ašʿarī theological
voluntarism and refutation of Muʿtazilī ethical realism and theodicy.54 What
he advocates in his commentary on the Išārāt, however, is not theological
voluntarism—as Avicenna does not conceive of the Creator as a voluntary
agent—but philosophical rigour. Al-Rāzī argues that Avicenna wades into a
52 Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, Chapter 4.
53 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 553–555 (pp. 79–80 below).
54 Shihadeh,Teleological Ethics, Chapter 2. Although, at the end of the passage, al-Rāzī refers
briefly to the great pleasures he hopes to attain in the hereafter, this should be read as a
digressive personal remark, and not as evidence of an eschatological theodicy (Šarḥ, 2,
p. 556; p. 81 below). In fact, he goes on to raise objections to the eschatological component
of Avicenna’s theodicy (Šarḥ, 2, pp. 556–562).
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question that, in his philosophical system, should in fact be a non-problem,
and he then fails to address it. A critically-mindedAvicennist, therefore, should
recognise that theodicy has no place in philosophy.
3 Translation: Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ al-Išārāt VII.8.1.55
3.1 [Exegetical Commentary]
3.1.1 Interpretation
The objective of this section is to identify the causes of evil. The discussion
starts from the following division: an existent is either purely good, predom-
inantly good, equally good and evil, predominantly evil, or purely evil. These
five disjuncts are exhaustive.
As for the first division, divine wisdom, being the origin of mercy and the
source of goodness and munificence, determines its realisation. The realisa-
tion of the second division [too] is determined by [divine] wisdom, because
if it were not realised, the predominant goods [therein] would remain unre-
alised. So, the realisation of [this division] results in little harm and a great
good, and the nonrealisation thereof would result in the opposite; wisdom dic-
tates that the lesser of twoharmsought to be endured for the sake of preventing
the greater of the two. This is what they [i.e. primarily Avicenna] mean by say-
ing that the nonrealisation of a greater good for the sake of preventing aminor
evil is a great evil. An example of this division is fire; for it is impossible for it to
exist possessed of its nature and property, which provides immense benefits,
without it being such that on occasion it results in the burning of an animal.
[Likewise,] humans cannot exist with the soul, body, faculties and properties
theyhavewithout some individuals accidentally being affectedby flaws in their
theoretical or practical dispositions, which cause them harm in the hereafter.
As for the remaining three divisions, none of them exist. For when we reflect
on the conditions of the inhabitants of this world,56 we find that even though
illness and pain are abundant, health and soundness are more prevalent, more
complete and more plentiful.
Knowing this, it becomes evident that evil enters divine determination by
accident, which is to say that because things that are predominantly good are
produced for the sake of their preponderant goods, the minor evils concomi-
tant to them inexorably exist. Were they not concomitant to those goods, they
would not have existed.
55 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 548–556.
56 Reading ahl hāḏā l-ʿālam, as in some MSS.
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3.2 [Aporetic Commentary]
3.2.1 [For Avicenna, Evil Should Not Be a Problem]
One may argue to the philosophers [as follows]. You are, in accordance with
yourprinciples (uṣūl), exempt fromhaving to enquire into this problem; so your
discussion thereof is superfluous ( fuḍūl). We say that “you are, in accordance
with your principles, exempt from having to enquire into it”, because sound
enquiry into this problem is conditional on both the view that the Agent who
produced theworld is freely choosing (muḫtār) and the view that goodness and
badness are rational, whereas you subscribe to neither of these two principles.
The view [that the Creator is] a freely choosing agent is prerequisite because
the question, “Why does evil exist in the acts of God?”, applies only if He is
a freely choosing [agent], able either to act or not to act, so that it could be
asked, “Why did He do this, and not that?”. If, however, He necessitates (mūǧib)
[His acts] through His essence, such that it is rationally impossible for Him not
to produce the things that proceed from Him, one cannot ask, “Why did He
do this, and not that?”. For the answer would then be that these acts proceed
from Him because His essence necessitates them through itself, and it would
be rationally impossible for them not to proceed fromHim, whether these acts
are purely good or purely evil.
As for the view that the goodness and badness [of acts] are rational, it is
prerequisite because if it is not accepted, everything will be good and rightly
done by God, as Ašʿarīs hold. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that God cannot
possibly do evil, and that He necessarily does good.
It follows that this enquiry presupposes the position of those who subscribe
to these twoprinciples, namely theMuʿtazila. As for thosewhodeny them, they
are exempt from this enquiry, so their discussion of it is superfluous.
3.2.2 [Alternative Objectives to the Enquiry into Evil]
The philosophers may say [in response]: “Our objective from this enquiry is
twofold. The first is to know under which of the foregoing five divisions [each
of] the things created by God falls, which is to say that the aim is to find out
whether creatures are purely good, purely evil, ormixed [of good and evil]. The
second is that we hold that God’s knowledge of the most perfect order is the
cause for the existence of that order. So we delineated the most perfect order
in order to establish that it exists”.
3.2.3 [The Avicennan Principle that Evil Is Privative]
Putting this consideration aside, [we argue that] the disjunction onwhich they
have based the foremost principle in this discussion turns on a conception of
the essence of good and evil. So we must first of all enquire into this.
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We say, it is conventional among the philosophers to say that good is exis-
tence and that evil is privation, and they sometimes try to infer this from exam-
ples. For instance, they say: “We judge killing to be evil, butwhenwedistinguish
its existent aspects from its privative aspects, we find that evil is nothing but
privatives. For if we consider the killer’s being capable of killing, [we find that]
it is good, because capacity is a perfection and good; if we consider the knife’s
[property of] cutting, [we find that] it is good, because the perfection of a knife
is that it be so; and if we consider an organ’s susceptibility to being cut, [we find
that] it too is good, because if it were hard and impervious to knives, thatwould
be evil. However, if we consider the loss of the killed person’s life, and the break-
ing up of the continuity of his body, we find that they are evil; and it is known
that these two aspects are privative.We know, therefore, that good is existence
and that evil is privation”.
3.2.4 [Avicenna’s Definitions of Good and Evil]
Know that this is not a good argument, because one who says, “Good is exis-
tence, and evil is privation”, may intend by this [1] to define (tafsīr) the expres-
sion “good” as existence, and the expression “evil” as privation. In this case,
however, one would not need to infer and argue for this, because anyone may
define any expression they wish with any meaning they wish. Alternatively,
should one intend by this [2] to pass a judgement on the good, that it must
be existent, and on the bad, that it must be privative, such that [the asser-
tion] becomes a proposition whose subject is “the good” and whose predicate
is “existent”, then this would be achievable only after the essences of good and
evil have been conceptualised. But this is what we are currently discussing. It
follows that [the argument] they adduce is inadequate. Putting this consider-
ation aside, [we further argue that] this [argument] rests on the mere citation
of examples; and you already know that this does not provide certainty.
3.2.5 [The Lexical Definitions of Good and Evil]
Know that what people mean by the expression “evil”, in common and preva-
lent parlance, is nothing but pain or what results in it. It is known immediately
that pain is something existent; there is no disagreement on this among sound-
minded people. Granted, some people claim that pleasure is the cessation of
pain, and thus view it as something privative. However, there is no disagree-
ment among them on that pain is something existent. This being the case, it is
evident that what people refer to by the expression “evil” is something existent.
As for “good”, it may apply to the privation of pain, such that it is said of a man
in a state of soundness that he is in a good [state] ( fī l-ḫayr), or it may apply to
pleasure.
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3.2.6 [The Ontology of Pleasure]
Now that you know these details, let us leave aside the discussion of expres-
sions. We say, a living being must be in either of three states: it can be in [a
state of] pleasure, or in pain, or devoid of both. As for pleasure, some people
have denied its existence, specifically Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī, for
he claimed that it has no reality other than the cessation of pain. So the plea-
sure we find in eating has no reality other than the cessation of the pain of
hunger, and the pleasure we find in drinking has no reality other than the ces-
sation of the pain of thirst. For this reason, the greater the hunger and thirst,
the more intense the pleasure that obtains from eating and drinking. Likewise,
the pleasure that obtains from sitting in a cool breeze in summer and in awarm
breeze inwinter is the cessation of pain [caused by] a harmful quality, and so is
the pleasure that obtains from wearing clothes and riding means of transport.
Similarly, the pleasure that obtains from sexual intercourse stems only from
expelling a harmful waste substance.57
Most philosophers and theologians, however, reject this view for [the follow-
ing] reasons.
The first is that it is impossible for privation to vary in intensity andmildness.
If pleasure were privative, no pleasure would be more intense than another
pleasure.
The second is that we find pleasure in the perception of a sound or an
image that we perceive, before it occurs to us that it exists; so it cannot be
claimed that this pleasure obtains from the cessation of the pain of desire. For
in this case, pleasure obtains without coinciding with a cessation of pain. Like-
wise, we experience pleasure in looking at some individuals, but suffer no pain
from their absence; so it cannot be said that pleasure is relief from a painful
thing.
The third is that it follows from [Ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī’s view] that it would
not be sensible for sound-minded people whose appetite is poor to treat their
poor appetite using foul-tasting drugs so as to find pleasure in food. For they
would then be much the same as one who torments himself so as to experi-
ence pleasure when he ceases to torment himself.58
These are [the arguments] that have been adduced against the view of
Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā.
57 That is, semen.
58 Reading taʿḏībihā for taġḏiyatihā. So although the acts in both cases correspond, the resul-
tant pleasures do not.
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3.2.7 [The Purpose of Creation, and the Plenitude of Evil]
The existence of pleasure having been established, we say that the purpose of
creation is to make possible the experience either of pleasures, or of pains,
or of neither pleasures nor pains. If [the purpose is] to give [creatures] the
opportunity to experience pleasures, this would prove false if we accepted Ibn
Zakariyyā’s view. Shouldweconcede, however, that [pleasure] is something real
(ṯubūtī), we will, upon reflection, find that pleasure is exceedinglymeagre, and
that what prevails among people, rather, is either pain or the cessation of pain,
because soundness has no reality save the body’s constantly being devoid of
pain. The saying, “soundness [i.e. health] is pleasurable”, is a delusional notion;
for pleasure is a state found [internally by the perceiver] (ḥāla wiǧdāniyya),59
so unless we find it in ourselves it cannot be claimed to exist. We shall set this
out in more detail in Chapter Eight.60 Likewise, being free from external and
internal harms has no reality save the absence of pain and the absence of what
results in pain. Also, life amenities, such as accommodation, property, wealth
and prestige, are, when available, nothing but means to prevent foreseeable
pains. As for the pleasures that obtain from eating, drinking, sitting in an agree-
able breeze and wearing agreeable clothes, they reduce to the cessation of the
pain of hunger and thirst and the discomfort caused by heat and cold.
It cannot be argued that if this were the case, no food would be preferable
to another, nor would a female sexual mate be preferable to another, for if the
objective [sought] in all alternatives were to eliminate the pain of hunger or
the pain caused by awaste substance—an objective attainable through any [of
these alternatives]—all [alternatives] would necessarily be equivalent, just as
no fire is preferable to another fire since the objective in seekingwarmth by fire
is to eliminate the pain of cold. For wewould say [in response] that this is false,
for it is possible that one food is preferable to another food, despite the two
being equivalent in their elimination of hunger, either because the unpalatable
food causes pain by its taste, smell, appearance or associations, or because the
excessive consumption of [a food] has resulted in boredom [with it], whereas
the palatable food is characterised by the contrary of these attributes. So, of
course, [we find] one food preferable to another, and one female sexual mate
preferable to another.
It follows from what we have set out that the state most pervasive among
people is either pain or the cessation of pain, and that pleasure that obtains as
an existent quality over and above the cessation of pain occurs only in cases
59 See p. 73 above.
60 Al-Rāzī, Šarḥ, 2, pp. 547ff.
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so rare that they are like a drop in the ocean—for instance, the pleasures, as
you mentioned, brought about by an image or a sound whose existence was
unknown before they were perceived, and the like. As for pains, they are vastly
abundant, although some are intensely severe, such as illnesses, while others
are mild, and these are things that bear upon man most of the time, such as
distress, anxiety, fear, trepidation, shame and anger, the pains that result from
hunger, thirst, working in professions and trades, smelling foul smells, associat-
ing with obnoxious people, seeing repugnant things, the harms caused by flies,
fleas, lice and ants, and all other things which are too many to enumerate and
encompass.
Now that it has been established that pains are preponderant and that real
pleasures are comparatively meagre, had the purpose of creating and bring-
ing [the world] into being been these paltry pleasures—when the Creator
knew that abundant pains would occur—[He] would have knowingly created
a preponderant evil for the sake of a comparatively meagre good.61 It thereby
becomes evident that their assertion, that the good is prevalent in this world,
is false.
It cannot be argued that although illness is endemic, health is predominant.
For we would say that this is a feeble [argument], because we have already
shown that health is a privative state—namely, man’s constantly being devoid
of pleasure and pain—and this is not what we are currently discussing. If, how-
ever, it is said that the purpose of creating humans and other animals is to
expose them to pains, then this would be downright evil; and it is not a view
ever held by anyone. Should it be said, alternatively, that the purpose thereof
is to make possible [for creatures] neither pleasure nor pain, we would say
[in response] that this is not a sound motive for creating and bringing [the
world] into being, because this [condition] would be equivalent [for creatures]
to remaining in absolute non-existence. In fact, [the latter] would be the more
favourable option; for just as onewould not receive thatmeagre good, hewould
not suffer the preponderant evil. Remaining in non-existence is, therefore, the
more favourable option.
3.2.8 [Again, for Avicenna, Evil Should Not Be a Problem]
At this impasse, you will find that critical investigators (muḥaqqiq) among the
philosophers say, “The question, ‘Why did God create the world?’, is a ques-
tion that seeks out a cause (ʿilla), and as such it is vacuous; for God created the
world through His essence, and not through a cause”. We say to them concern-
61 Reading iltizām for ilzām.
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ing this: You have now admitted your true doctrine, which is that God is a cause
throughHis essence. Itwould accordinglybewrong to ask, “Whydoes evil occur
inHis creatures?”; for what [is caused] through an essence cannot be explained
through a different cause.What wementioned at the start has by now become
evident, namely that their discussion of this problem is superfluous, unless it
is interpreted in either of the two aforementioned ways.62
3.2.9 [Evil Is a Problem Only for the Muʿtazila]
As for exponents of [the doctrine that the Creator is] a freely choosing agent,
somedeny that goodness and badness are rational, and say that all of God’s acts
are rightly done and good.63 So they too are exempt from this enquiry. However,
those who subscribe to this [theory]—namely, the Muʿtazila—maintain that
the purpose of creation is to proffer benefits (manāfiʿ), and it is fair to say that,
[on this view,] the purpose cannot be to proffer this-worldly pleasures; for, rel-
ative to pains, they are like a drop in the ocean, as established earlier. It would
be more plausible, rather, to postulate that the purpose is to proffer pleasures
in the hereafter.
3.2.10 [A Personal Reflection]
The author Faḫr al-DīnMuḥammad b. ʿUmar says:64 Formy part, for the overall
wellbeingwithwhichGod has favouredme, somuch so that I have been excep-
tional in this respect compared to most people, if I now return to myself and
compare real pleasures—which is not to say, privative things—to both appar-
ent and unapparent pains, as we set them out previously, I65 find pleasures
paltry in comparison to pains. This being the case, how could such pleasures
be desired, when they are correlated to these pains! Had it not been for the
great pleasures we hope [to attain] in the hereafter, continued non-existence
would have been the preferable option.66
62 See p. 76 above.
63 Mainly the Ašʿarīs, as mentioned earlier.
64 This was either written in by al-Rāzī himself, or added by a copyist. Some MSS add the
nisba al-Rāzī and formulaic prayers.
65 Or “we”, according to some MSS.
66 This paperwas delivered at “La réception de la notion avicennienne de la providence dans
les différentes traditionsmusulmanes”, a seminar series organised at the CNRS byMeryem
Sebti and Daniel De Smet, and at a workshop at LMUMunich. I am grateful for comments
I received from the audience, Jari Kaukua, Michael Noble and an anonymous reviewer. I
alone am responsible for the contents. This work was supported by the Arts and Human-
ities Research Council (Grant number AH/J000140/1).
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